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ED
JLIN - 2 1981
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
····-····--·"··----------------~

C.I ~r1~. Su;::ir,ma Court, Utah"

STANLEY MARTIN REDD,
SHEILA M. REDD, his wife;
STERLING HARDSON REDD,
JILL D. REDD, his wife;
PAUL DUTSON and DONNA
DUTSON, his wife,

ADDITION OF
NEW AUTHORITY TO BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Case No. 17231

WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

Defendant-respondent Western Savings and Loan Company
(Western Savings), pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby submits additional authority in support
of its position in the above-entitled case.
Williams v. First

Fede~al

Savings and Loan Associa-

tion of Arlington, No. 80-1446 (4th Cir., filed May 26, 1981),
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is an opinion deciding four
separate

~ctions

challenging the enforcement of

clauses in Virginia.

due~on-sale

In Williams, two of the defendant-respon-

dent savings and loan associations were state chartered (as is
Western Savings), and two were federally chartered.

None of the

Williams court's decisions which bear upon the case at bar turn
upon the source of the savings and loan association's charter.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Williams supports Western Savings' arguments presented in its brief and at oral argument conducted May 12,
1981, in the following respects:
1.

The Court of Appeals held that due-on-sale

clauses do not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation and that there is nothing inherently unfair or unreasonable in enforcing such provisions.

See Williams, supra, at

34-50.
2.

In making a detailed analysis of real estate

financing, real estate marketing, and the impact of due-on-sale
clauses, the court recognized that the appellants in Williams,
as appellants in the case

a~

bar:

(1) are seeking to obtain

unbargained for, windfall profits by transferring not only
their properties but also their below-market-rate loans, see
id. at 8-13, 34-50; and (2) are seeking "to shift to others
burdens properly belonging on thei-r own shoulders."

Id. at

12-13.
3.
the case

~elied

The court rejected the arguments presented in
upon most heavily by appellants, Wellenkamp v.

Bank of America, 21 Cal.3d 943, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), and exposed the numerous flaws and non sequiturs in those arguments.
See Williams at n. 29.
4.

The court rejected the argument that the due-

on-sale clause was intended only as a protection of the lender's
security interest.

See id. at n. 36.
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5.

In their brief, appellants contended that they

would be forced to pay a prepayment penalty in addition to the
accelerated balance of the loan.

At oral argument, Western

Savings' counsel rebutted this contention by informing the
court that 12 C.F.R. B-3(g) (2), which prohibits collection of
a prepayment penalty when a loan balance is accelerated, was
applicable to Western Savings pursuant to Sections 7-7-5.1 and
7-13-74, Utah Code Annotated.

In Williams, the court recog-

nized that 12 C.F.R. B-3(g) (2) prohibited collection of a prepayment penalty when the due-on-sale provisions were invoked.
See Williams, supra, at 34 and n. 38.
6.

The enforceability of the due-on-sale clause in

the case at bar is even stronger than in Williams.

Like

Williams, there is no allegation or evidence to suggest there
is anything "amiss" in Western Savings' acceleration procedures.
But unlike Williams, where there was

a

substantial question

whether the method of transfer of the subject property
"triggered" the due-on-sale clause, there is no question that
Western Savings' due-on-sale clause expressly covered the transfer of the subject 24-unit apartment complex pursuant to a
contract of sale.
Pursuant to Rule 73(p) (3), the correcting page containing the above-described newly uncovered authority is filed
herewith.
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DATED this 2nd day of June, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard W. Giauque
James R. Holbrook
Stephen T. Hard
GIAUQUE, HOLBROOK, BENDINGER
& GURMANKIN, P.C.
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

By,q~z•
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Addition of New Authority to Brief of Respondent and Newly
Uncovered Authority for Brief of Respondent, page 9, were
hand delivered to Neil R. Sabin of Stringham, Larsen, Mazuran
& Sabin,

200 North Main Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City,

Utah 84103, thi> 2nd day of Jun~~
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 80-1446
Jeffrey W. Williams
Susan K. Williams
On their own behalf and as
representatives of a class
of homeowners
J. Peter Bittner
Marsha H. Bittner
Mary S. Boyd
Richard E. Nault,

FILED
!AAY 2 61981
U. :;. Court of Appeals
Fourth Circi:it

Appellants,
v.
First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Arlington
Individually and as rep. of a
class of lenders
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
Arlington-Fairfax Savings and
Loan Association
Herndon Federal Savings and
Loan Association,
Appellees.

No. 81-1005
Arthur G. Pote
Laura R. Pote
Angel Saltos
Beatriz De Saltos,

Appellants,

v.
Washington-Lee Savings and
Loan Association,

Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Oren R. Lewis, Senior District
Judge.
Argued

March 5, 1981

Decided

May 26, 1981

Before BUTZNER, PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.
Paul D. Scanlon for Appellants; E. Waller Dudley and Robert Lasky
(Boothe, Prichard & Dudley; Paul C. Kincheloe, Jr.; Kincheloe &
Carlson; Jesse B. Wilson, III; Mccandlish, Lillard, Church & Best;
Robert T. Lasky; Mark c. Ellenberg; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
on brief in No. 80-1446) (W. Curtis Sewell; John E. Coffey; Thomas
& Sewell on brief in Nos. 80-1446 and 81-1005) for appellees.
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~URNAGHAN,

Circuit Judge:

The case touches many Americans, for it involves the common
experience of purchasing a home.

Customarily one contemplates a

borrowing secured by a lien on the residential parcel to meet a
substantial portion of the purchase price.

Few are able first,

before buying a house, to accrue all the necessary funds.
It is from that common experience that the present case
evolves.

The facts are influenced by another common experience

of less ancient lineage, namely, persistent, consistently high,
rates of inflation, accompanied by increased interest rates.
1
The plaintiffs in the four consolidated cases are (a) in
two of the cases, the persons who, when they bought their homes some
time ago, imposed deeds of trust on the parcels of residential real

1

Three of the cases, given the combination title of Williams,
et al. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, et al.,
No. 80-1446, were consolidated for trial below. The fourt.~,
Pote v. Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association, No. 81-1005,
was consolidated with the others on appeal.
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estate as security for loans incurred to meet part of the purchase
price and (b) in all four cases, the persons who subsequently bought
tne real estate, and, in doing so, sought to assume the liabilities
secured by the deeds of trust and to have them continue in force for
the balance of their original terms, typically 30 years.

The

defendants are the lending institutions, and the questions at issue
all coalesce into the ultimate one of whether provisions in the
deeds of trust known as due-on-sale clauses purporting to permit
acceleration of the maturity of the loans upon sales of the premises
(a) were triggered, and (b), if triggered, were legally enforceable.

2

2

Williams, et al. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, et al., involving three of the transactions before us,
attacks only on the grounds that the due-on-sale clauses were
not triggered, in view of the form the transactions took.
Pote v. Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association raises
that question and the additional contention as well, that,
if the due-on-sale clause was, indeed, triggered, it was,
nevertheless, legally unenforceable.
A preliminary matter for consideration is the one of our
jurisdiction to hear the cases. The Pote case presents no
problem inasmuch as the parties are dIVerse. The Potes are
residents of Michigan. The persons to whom they sold, the
Saltos, are residents of Columbia. The defendant WashingtonLee Savings and Loan Association is a Virginia corporation
with its principal office in Virginia.
Jurisdiction in the other three cases is not quite so certain.
No diversity jurisdiction has been asserted, presumably because
of the commonality of citizenship o~ some,of the homeowners
and of the lenders.
However, in the case of Williams v. First Federal Savings

- 3 -
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We choose, for simplicity's sake, in dealing with the
first question, which is whether the due-on-sale clauses were, in

(Cont'd)
and Loan Association of Arlington, a federal question under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 has been raised. The deed of trust in that
case was executed on April 27, 1977, well after the June 8
1976 effective date of regulations of the Federal Home Loa~
Bank Board ("FHLBB"), originally codified as 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-ll(f} and (g) and recodified in 1980 as 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(f) and (g).
Those regulations provide, inter alia:
An association continues to have the
power to include, as a matter of contract
between it and the borrower, a provision
in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately
due and payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or
any part of the real property securing the
loan is sold or transferred by the borrower
without the association's prior written
consent.

The deed of trust, on a uniform instrument form for use in
Virginia for deeds of trust within the purview of operations
by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"} and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC"), employed
essentially the regulation language:
If all or any part of the Property or an
interest therein is sold or transferred by
Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, . . • Lender may, at Lender's option,
declare all sums secured by this Deed of
Trust to be immediately due and payable.
Thus, the federal question arises as to whether, as a
matter of contract between the lender and the borrower, a
provision having been included declaring immediately due
and payable the deed of trust if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan was sold or transferred, the transactions through which Mrs. Bailey and the Williams changed
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fact, triggered, to single out for detailed description the transactions involving Jeffrey W. Williams et ux, since their case is
the one which happens to supply the caption for reference purposes.
However, since Thomas A. Bailey and Sharon S. Bailey actually had
the contractual relations with First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington, and not the Williams, who merely sought to assume
the obligation of Mrs. Bailey (to whom all joint interests in the
property had been conveyed by Mr. Bailey), we concentrate on the
interests of Mrs. Bailey through whom the rights of the Williams
derive.

2

(Cont'd)
beneficial ownership constituted a sale or transfer as
contemplated by the regulation.
It is true that the deed of trust states that it shall
be governed by the law of Virginia, the jurisdiction in
which the property is located. That language, however, relates to the validity or invalidity of provisions and does
not extend to questions of which, as between competing
interpretations, should be accorded language when either
would be perfectly valid.
The other two cases (Boyd v. Arlington-Fairfax Savings and
Loan Association and Milne v. Herndon Federal Savings and Loan
Association) are les3 certain as to jurisdiction, either
because the association is state chartered or because the
deed of trust, while to a federal savings and loan association,
antedated the FHLBB re~ulations and did not conform to thero
in its language. Neve~theless, we proceed on the belief that
they, too, oroperly rais~ a federal queseion.
If, in fact,
they should.have been disnissed for want of jurisdiction, in
view of the conclusions we have reached on the law, the
result would not, because of stare decisis, significantly
differ from a holding affirming the lower court.
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On April 27, 1977, the Baileys purchased a home located
ai

8061 Powder Brook Lane, Springfield, Virginia.

In Virginia,

the forms used to impose a mortgage security interest, or lien,
on land commonly employed in other parts of the United States are
not used.

Instead, resort has been to the deed of trust.

While

the formalities differ, for many essential intents and purposes,
3

though by no means all, a deed of trust is equivalent to a mortgage.

See Larchmont Homes, Inc. v. Annandale Water co., 201 Va.
178:-TBl, 110 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1959) ("Black defines a deed
of trust at page 503 as 'an instrument in use in many states,
taking the place and serving the uses of a common-law mortgage,
by which the legal title to real property is placed in one or
more trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or
the performance of other conditions.'"); Yasuna v. Miller, 399
A.2d 68, 71-72 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1979) ("Deeds of trust are
viewed as generally equivalent to common law mortgages, a
mortgage being by definition an interest in property given
as security for the payment of a debt."); LeBrun v. Prosise,
197 Md. 466, 473-74, 79 A.2d 543, 547 (1951) ("This deed of
trust is like deeds of trust which, we understand, are generally
used in Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia in
lieu of mortgages and are not infrequently so used in Montgomery
and Prince George's Counties and perhaps in other counties
bordering on the Potomac.
It is also similar to deeds of trust
ordinarily executed by corporations to secure issues of negotiable or transferable bonds. For most purposes any such deed
of trust is a mortgage, . • . and is subject to some (but not
all) statutory provisions relating to mortgages • • • . On the
other hand, some statutory provisions distinguish between
'mortgage' or 'deed in the nature of a mortgage' and 'deeds of
trust in the nature of mortgages' . • . • "); but cf. Billingsley
v. Mitchell, 257 Md. 301, 304, 262 A.2d 746, 747 (1970) (" . • •
a deed of trust securing a debt although it serves the purpose
and performs the function of a mortgage is not in the eyes of
the Maryland law a mortgage or a deed in the nature of a mortgage, . . . . ").
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While appellants urge that differences in the two types
of security device play a relevant role in the formulation of the
method employed to shift ownership of the homes in the several
consolidated cases, and, in particular, from Mrs. Bailey to the
Williams, it is not evident to us why that is so.

4

The purchase price paid by the Baileys on April 27, 1977
($63,831) was met in part by a loan from First Federal Savings and
Loan Association of Arlington, in the face amount of $55,000 at
the time of settlement, secured by a deed of trust.
outstanding principal had been reduced to $53,903.63.

By 1980, the
The term of

the loan was 30 years.
Interest on the loan was fixed at 10% per
5
annum.
Repayment was to be made in level monthly installments

Thus, for example, the mortgagor owns an equity of redemption. A trustee, like a mortgagee, holds legal title, and the
borrower has only equitable interests. ~ Everette v.
Woodward, 162 Va. 419, 426, 174 S.E. 864, 867 (1934) ("The
trustee's power of sale is coupled with an interest; that is,
he holds the legal title, while the granter in the trust
deed has the equitable title.").
5

Some of the precise figures for the Bailey-Williams transaction do not appear in the record. We deprecate the failure
of counsel to include in the record so relevant a document as
the note secured by the deed of trust from the Baileys, containing as it does particulars of the loan terms. We have
been able, nevertheless, to make reasonably accurate approximations. The figures need be only approximate for the illustrative
purposes they serve.
'
Thus the 1977 interest rate applicable to the Bailey's
borrowing from First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Arlington was somewhere between 10% and 10:25% per annum. For
convenience, we shall refer to the annual interest rate payable
by Mrs. Bailey as 10%.

- 7 -
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of $492.

The deed of trust dated April 27, 1977, constituted a

first lien in favor of the lender, First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Arlington.
On October 3, 1977, Mr. Bailey had relinquished all his
interest in the Springfield, Virginia premises to Mrs. Bailey.
in 1979, decided to sell.

She,

In the interim, since the time of the

1977 purchase, interest rates on financing for purposes of acquiring a house had radically altered, with the going rate having risen
to approximately 15% per annum instead of the 10% financing which
had been available to the Baileys when they purchased in 1977.

As

a consequence, in the secondary market in first mortgages, the
actual value of the loan secured by the Bailey deed of trust was
approximately $38,000, despite its face value of $53,903.63.

In

other words, a discount of approximately 29% had occurred.
To guard against the possibility of the adverse impact
of such discounts, home lending organizations had resorted to
insertion in the instruments covering loan trans.ictions of "dueon-sale" clauses.

6

6

The clauses provided that, on transfer of the

Three of the four deeds of trust (one for each of the
consolidated cases) employed a June, 1975 uniform instrument of
the FNMA and the FHLMC, instrumentalitie~ which, in conjunction with the FHLBB operated to further interests of the
Federal Government in the residential lending area. Two of
the four lenders (First Federal Savings and Loan Association
of Arlington and Herndon Federal Savings and Loan Association)
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

premises, by the borrower, unless the approval or consent of

the lender was first obtained, the loan would be fully callable,
becoming immediately due and payable, at the option of the lender.

6

7

(Cont'd)
include in their titles the word "federal." Interestingly, the
only lender to use another deed of trust form than the uniform
FNMA-FHLMC document was one of the federal associations, Herndon
Federal Savings and Loan Association. In the case of ArlingtonFairfax Savings and Loan Association, the appellants treated it
as a federal association, asserting in the Complaint that it is
"a federal savings and loan association under the provisions
of the Horne OWner's Loan Act, 12 u.s.c. § 1461, et seq.
(Arlington-Fairfax converted)." Similarly, withrespect to
Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association the Complaint
alleged:
"The Defendant is a state chartered Savings and
Loan Association: a Federal Home Loan Bank Member; Seller
Servicer for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and an
insured institution of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation" and "a Federally related Lender."
In all events the deed of trust forms employed in general
represented a nationwide federal policy favoring due-on-sale
clauses.

7

The language in the Bailey deed of trust on April 27, 1977,
in favor of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Arlington read:
"Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all
or any of the Property or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) Creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust . • . Lender may, at Lender's
option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to
be immediately due and payable. •
"
That language, from Section 17 of the Uniform FNMA-FHLMC
instrument form, also was used in the case of the Pote deed of
trust to Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association dated
March 14, 1976.
For another lender, Arlington-Fairfax Savinqs and Loan Association (the borrower being Mary S. Boyd), the phraseology

-

9 -
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In current market conditions, the due-on-sale clause
obviously would be viewed with distaste by people in the shoes of

7

(Cont'd)
under the deed of trust of November 29, 1977, initially was
identical with that appearing in the Bailey-Williams and Pote
deeds of trust.
However, by an agreement of modification,
also dated November 29, 1977, the language was changed to read:
"IN THE EVENT TITLE to the property above described is transferred, the unpaid balance of the indebtedness hereby secured
shall be immediately due and payable, at the option of the party
cf the third part."
In the case of Herndon Federal Savings and Loan Association,
which had on June 24, 1975, made a secured loan to John K.
Milne et ux. the language ran:
"If the aforesaid described
property is sold or conveyed prior to the maturity date of
the note hereinabove described and secured hereby, the said
note shall be immediately due and payable in full at the option
of the holder thereof."
Each deed of trust in the consolidated cases also contained
in the margin the following capitalized statement:
NOTICE: THE DEBT SECURED HEREBY IS
SUBJECT TO CALL IN FULL OR THE TERMS THEREOF
BEING MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY CONVEYED (or SECURED
HEREBY).
The statement was mandated by Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34 reading:
Where any loan is made secured by a
mortgage or deed of trust on real property
. . . and the note, or mortgage or deed of
trust evidencing such loan contains a provision that the holder of the note secured by
such mortgage or deed of trust may accelerate
payment of or renegotiate the terms of su~h
loan upon sale or conveyance of the security
property or part thereof, then the mortgage
or deed of trust shall contain in the body or
on the margin thereof a [the following] s~ate
ment either in capital letters or underlined:
"Notice -- The debt secured hereby is subject

- 10 -
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Mrs. Bailey, for a mortgage or deed of trust which could otherwise continue until the original fixed maturity date (here 2007)
;t an extremely favorable interest rate (10% as against the current 15%) would be lost to them.

Such a loan, if transferable

to a buyer through assumption thereof as part of his purchasing
arrangements, would have a distinct economic value.

To illustrate,

Mrs. Bailey, if the loan were transferable, would be able to realize
more from the sale of her house than if she were forced to comply
with the due-on-sale clause.

7

8

(Cont'd)
to call in full or the terms thereof being
modified in the event of sale or conveyance of the property conveyed [secured
hereby]."
The bracketed language appeared in the initial enactment by
Ch. 292 of the Acts of 1974. The word immediately before the
bracketed language, in each case, was substituted by Ch. 448
of the Acts of 1975, and, for our purposes, effected no substantive alteration.
A companion statute, Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.33, contemporaneously enacted and reenacted in 1974 and 1975, prohibited
any lender from collecting or receiving any prepayment penalty
if prepayment should result from the enforcement of the
right to call the loan upon the sale of the real property
securing the loan.

8

For example, an unencumbered house might have a market
value of $100,000.
If it had an unexpired mortgage or deed
of trust on it covering an outstanding unpaid balance of
$50,000 payable over another 27 years at a rate of 10%, and
that obligation could be transferred, in today's market that
house would realize something in the neighborhood of $115,000,
i.e. more than the property free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances would bring.
It is no answer to that somewhat anomalous state of affairs
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In the final analysis, one must conclude that
people like Mrs. Bailey are simply too eager to shift to others

(Cont'd)
that the person owning the house outright could also realize
$115,000 by himself granting a purchase money mortgage or
purchase money deed of trust at 10% for 27 vears. The extension of such unrealistically favorable borrowing terms would
represent an economic disadvantage here capable of evaluation
at $15,000. The outright owner of his house who would have
to impose on himself the $15,000 economic disadvantage would
consequently be worse off than a couple who, were they able
to effect a transfer of the loan, would be able to keeo the
entire $15,000, placing the economic disadvantage on a· third
party, the deed of trust lender. So, Mrs. Bailey and her
co-appellants argue for a result under which they would be
better off than a prudent couple who owned their home free
and clear.
In the case of a property worth $100,000 if totally unencumbered, which is subject to a mortgage or deed of trust with
27 years still to run at an interest rate of 10% per annum,
and the outstanding unpaid principal amounting to $50,000,
let us assume that buyers would be willing to pay cash of
$65,000, and either (a) assume the favorable 10% mortgage of
$50,000, or (bl, if they must, go into the current mortgage
market and pay its equivalent. The equivalent, in approximate
terms, would be a $35,000 27 year mortgage at 15%.
(The
monthly level payments on $50,000 at 10% per annum would be
substantially the same as the monthly payments on $35,000 at
15%.)
Under the former procedure, the selling couple would net
since they would need pay nothing towards satisfaction
of r.he deed of trust note (assuming no subsequent default by
the buyers).
Under the latter procedure, however, the deed
of tr11st note would have to be satisfied in full. The application of the $35,000 in new borrowing would still leave unpaid
$15,000 which would have to come out of the $65,000 so that the
sellers would net $50,000.
$6~,ooo,

Since the seller, for a $100,000 house, would be freed of
an outstanding obligation of $50,000, and additionally receive

- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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burdens properly belonging on their own shoulders.

Even if

the due-on-sale clause is valid, and has been triggered, and
Mrs. Bailey, must, therefore, accelerate and pay off the balance
due on her deed of trust loan, she, nevertheless, has been a
beneficiary economically, vis-~-vis the deed of trust lender,
as a result of the borrowing.

The effects of inflation have

served to erode the real, as distinct from the face, value of
money.

Hence, paying off $53,903.63 borrowed in 1977 with

$53,903.63 of 1980 or 1981 dollars provides Mrs. Bailey with a
9

tidy economic advantage.

8

(Cont'd)
$50,000 in cash, he would be as well off economically as a
homeowner having title free and clear, and netting $100,000.
Mrs. Bailey's contentions, consequently, were they to succeed,
would yield to her not only whatever profit inheres in the rise
in the real estate market (in the world of today, it was to be
expected that she and Mr. Bailey bought the house for less than
the $79,903.63 which was the price at which she sold to the
Williams. The purchase price was, in fact, $63,831.)
It would
also additionally confer on her an artificial profit attributable
to the decline in value of the deed of trust loan.
"What the
seller is then selling is his mortgage rate, and not his property •
• . . the mortgagor has already benefited from the loan terms,
and providing the benefit of transferability of those terms in
a pricing context . . . is a windfall." Article, Enforcement of
Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 Real Property, Probate and Trust
Journal 891, 926, 930 (1978) (hereafter "Enforcement"). Yet
the Baileys were not the investors, the risk takers, on the loan.
Nothing in reason commends a rule which would lead to such a
windfall.

9

As it happens, Mrs. Bailey enjoyed another advantage not vouchsafed to all home borrowers. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington had sold a 90% interest in her obligation
to the FHLMC. consequently, purchasers from her, if creditworthy, could arrange assumption for a 1% assumption fee.
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I.

Sale, Conveyance or Transfer.
The first thrust on behalf of appellants, in the jousting

with the savings and loan association lenders, is a contention that
the residential properties never were "sold or transferred," or
10
"sold or conveyed" or that title was not "transferred."
Hence,
the contention runs, the due-on-sale clauses have never, in fact,
operated to accelerate the loans.

Reliance is placed on the arti-

ficially elaborate form of the transactions employed for transferring title to the purchasers.
The transactions between Mrs. Bailey and the Williams
began routinely enough.

On November 7, 1979, Mrs. Bailey entered

a typical form real estate contract containing terms of sale,
and details as to settlement, brokerage commissions, and the like.
Foreshadowing what was to come, however, the November 7, 1979
contract, in an addendum, described the subject of the sale as
the beneficial interest in a land trust to be created by Mrs.
Bailey.
That contract of November 7, 1979 was reinforced by
one of the following day, November 8, 1979, called a "Contract

10

The assertion is made, mind you, despite the candid admission in Appellants' reply brief that:
wsome Appellants,
indeed, sold their 'principal residences' . • . to other
Appellants who use the residences as their 'homes.'"

- 14 -
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to Purchase by Assignment the Beneficial Interest in a Land Trust
Holding Real Estate."

It called for Mrs. Bailey to name herself

as trustee and to bring about a situation in which she, individually,
and she, as trustee, between them would have "full and complete
legal and equitable title . . . without lien or encumbrance of any
kind, except as noted in any Deed of Trust on the real estate

No point has been made that those contracts, of themselves, operated to trigger the due-on-sale clause.

We, there-

fore, do not address that question, which might not prove easy of
resolution.

On the one hand, the contracts did not affect possession,

but only the right to possession, upon satisfaction of contingencies,
especially meeting of the purchase price.

On the other hand, equit-

able title in the Williams, whatever verbiage to the contrary may
have been employed, was created by the contracts of November 7,
1979 and November 8, 1979.

See Bellingham First Federal Savings &

Loan Association v. Garrison, 87 Wash.2d 437, 439, 553 P.2d 1090, 1091
(1976)

("Thus the real estate contract executed by appellants and

defendants is an 'inter vivos transfer' within the meaning of the
[due-on-sale] clause."); Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 105, 295 N.W.2d 762, 766
(1973)

("In view of common and technical usage of the term 'convey'

and the purpose of the 'due on sale clause' of the mortgage and

- 15 -
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note, there is no ambiguity.

The land contract was a conveyance

that gave the purchaser an equitable title to the property as well
as the immediate right to possession.").
APP. 6 5 2 , 6 0 4 P • 2 d 5 0 4

See Terry v. Born, 24 wash.

( 19 7 9) .

Rather, the argument of the lenders derives from the
fact that Mrs. Bailey, on January 15, 1980, created a trust
(secondary, of course, and subject to the 1977 security deed of
trust), by means of a document entitled "Declaration and Deed into
a Land Trust."

Mrs. Bailey, individually, granted, bargained, and

assigned to herself as Trustee the parcel in Springfield, Virginia
"to have and to hold .

.

. in fee simple

The Trustee's

power to sell was conditioned on receipt of a consent to do so
from the trust beneficiary.

The Declaration and Deed into a Land

Trust was recorded among the land records of Fairfax County,
Virginia.
Mrs. Bailey, as Trustee, also on January 15, 1980,
entered into a land trust agreement with herself, designating
herself as sole beneficiary of the land trust, and providing that
the property had to be sold within twenty years.

Since, apart

from the November 7, 1979 and November 8, 1979 contracts with
the Williams, even without the January 15, 1980 agreement, only
the 1977 security deed of trust stood between 'Mrs. Bailey and
absolute title, legal and equitable, it may be questioned whether
the agreement was other than a superfluity.

See Larchmont Homes,
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Inc. v. Annandale Water Co., supra, 201 Va. at 181-82, 110 S.E.2d
at 252.

Cf. as to an analogous development re mortgages, 4 Restatement,

Property § 415, Comment a

(1944).

The purpose, apparently was to

effect a change in legal nomenclature so that all interests other
than the 1977 deed of trust would be denominated personal property,
not real property.
The conveyance to herself, creating the second trust, and
the land trust agreement with herself, designating herself as sole
beneficiary, the argument of appellants runs, were not contemplated
by the terms of the due-on-sale clause.

The due-on-sale clause

was to become operative only in the event of a transfer of title.
To appreciate the argument, one readily perceives that the title
has not essentially been affected in any way by the second deed
of trust, since beneficial interests of record remain exactly as
they were before the January 15, 1980 deed of trust and the January
15, 1980 agreement were executed.

Their sole effect, if any, was

to transform from "real" to "personal" in the hands of Mrs. Bailey
the rights to enjoy, occupy, and otherwise exercise rights of
ownership associated with possession.

To put it succinctly,

there was formally a "conveyance" but substantively no "transfer."
The District Court, nevertheless, concluded that the
mere change in the form of the title, accomplished as it was by
"grant, bargain and sale" triggered the due-on-sale clause.

Since

- 17 -
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no substantial change was accomplished we may have reservations
about that conclusion, but it makes no matter.
For then came the ingenious next step in the transaction,
one which Mrs. Bailey claims was a "transfer" but not a "conveyance."
(Now you see it, now you don't.)

Also on January 15, 1980, Mrs.

Bailey executed an "Assignment of Beneficial Interest in Land Trust"
undertaking to "sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over" all
rights, power, privileges and beneficial interest, including all interest in the property, subordinate to the 1977 deed of trust for the
benefit of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington,
as lender.

(Emphasis added.)

That document manifestly encompassed
11
all rights of enjoyment, occupancy, and use, in perpetuity.
However, appellants strive to place great reliance on the consideration
12
that the subject of the transfer was personal property.
Of course, one must wonder, in the year of our Lord, One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-One, what significance the

11

Counsel for appellants has written a brochure describing what
was assigned as "the exclusive right to exercise the normal
incidents of ownership."

12

The argument derives from the provision in Va. Ann. Code
55-17.1 governing creation of land trusts stating that the
interest of a beneficiary of a land trust should "be deemed to
be personal property.w The language was ·added to the statute
in 1975.
§

But such "deeming" could not, by the express terms of the
statute be "construed . . • to affect any right which a
creditor may otherwise have against a trustee or beneficiary.

- 18 -
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maneuvering has had.

The end result, with the Williams occupying

the property, is essentially no different from the situation the
Williams would have been in as purchasers in the customary real
estate sales transaction.

There can be no doubt that, had a

customary real estate deed been employed to accomplish directly
the essentially identical result reached by Mrs. Bailey's cir13
cuitous route, the due-on-sale clause would have been triggered.
If one travels by by-roads rather than use an interstate highway,
but ends up at the same destination, the journey has nonetheless

13

The appellants frankly concede in their Brief that the
Williams "now enjoy the structure as their home."
Indeed, it goes further than that.
Paul D. Scanlon, Esq.
and Paul D. Scanlon, Ltd., which we take to be a professional
association controlled by him, not only argued for all appellants in the consolidated cases.
Paul D. Scanlon, or his
professional association, was a participant in the transactions leading up to the litigation, accepting fees from both
buyer and seller in each case.
Counsel for appellants, therefore, can hardly fail to
contend that he effectively produced, in return for his fees,
a beneficial holding in the Williams, Mr. Nault, the Bittners
and the Saltos, respectively, equal in substance to that
which a customary real estate transaction involving purchase
of a home would have provided.

- 19 -
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taken place.

In their contract with the Williams, Mrs. Bailey
14
has been designated:
"Seller.•
That is where attempted ingenuity again enters the
picture.

Appellants argue that the due-on-sale clause goes

into operation only in the event of a "conveyance" or a "transfer
of title" of real estate.

They point to instances where, using

the words technically, for particular purposes, "conveyance" and
"transfer of title" concern only transfer of full legal, or, at

14

The contract further incorporated into itself by reference
the language of "a form contract" for "the sale and purchase
of real estate, setting forth the terms and conditions of
sale between the parties and warranties, covenants and conditions to be performed by the respective parties" provided
only that the subject matter of the contract should be "THE
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE LAND TRUST HEREIN ABOVE MENTIONED."
In a purely conclusory way, manifestly not binding on the
lender under the deed of trust, who was not a party to the
contracts between Mrs. Bailey and the Williams, nor binding
on the court as to what the contract in fact constituted or
accomplished, the contract added:
"The use of the attached
contract form is for the convenience of the parties and is
in no way to be interpreted as contemplating or intending
that the parties are agreeing to sell or purchase a real
estate interest, either legal or equitable." The plain fact
is that the Williams did purchase an interest in real estate
from Mrs. Bailey, whether or not, as between themselves, they
might choose to treat it as personalty. Two of us may agree
that the emperor is clothed, and are, therefore, estopped to
deny that he is caparisoned cap-a-pie. A third party is
nonetheless free to cry out the true fact that his imperial
majesty is as naked as the day he was born.

- 20 -
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the very least, equitable title.

15

And if an interest in real

estate is called personal property in one set of circumstances,
what it is called, they assert, takes precedence over what it is
for every purpose.

Title to real property, they urge, cannot en-

compass an interest which is merely "personal."

15

16

See Larchmont Homes, Inc. v. Annandale Water co., supra,
201 Va. at 181, 110 S.E.2d at 251 where the meaning of conveyance is discussed.
Black's Law Dictionary is quoted:
In real property law.
In the strict
legal sense, a transfer of legal title to
land.
In the popular sense, and as generally used by lawyers, it denotes any
transfer of title, legal or equitable . .

16

The argument has a fundamental frailty.
Bouvier contains
an enlightening discussion of the definition of "Title" derived
from Blackstone:
There are several stages or degrees
requisite to form a complete title to lands
and tenements. The lowest and most imperfect
degree of title is a presumptive title or the
mere possession, or actual occupation of the
estate, without any apparent right to hold or
continue such possession . . . • The next
step to a good and perfect title is the
right of possession, which may reside in
one man while the actual possession is not
in himself, but in another.
2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 3281 (8th ed. 1914)
in original).

(emphasis

Thus a couple such as the Williams had a kind of title,
however it was denominated, since they had the full right of
occupancy or possession.
Indeed, it should be noted that what reliance appellants
place in the word "title" is confined exclusively to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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They then seek to build on that base by reliance on the
~rgument

that, in cases of ambiguity, the ambiguity shall be resolved

against the preparer of the document, especially one possessing

16

(Cont'd)
Boyd-Fairfax Savings and Loan Association deed of trust. There
the due-on-sale clause operates if the "title is transferred."
As to the others, the controlling language is "Property or
an interest therein is sold or transferred," or "property is
sold or conveyed." In each of those cases, the property,
irrespective of whether it was real property or personal
property, was unmistakably "sold." Cf. Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md.
42, 46, 227 A.2d 26, 27
(1967), holdTng that an oral agreement, unenforceable under the statute of frauds, constituted
a sale for purposes of a provision reading:
"in the event the
Mortgagors sell the property hereby mortgaged . . . . "
Of course, over and beyond its other defects, the improbability of the reading advocated by appellants is fatal.
In
choosing language to create "uniform covenants for national
use . . . to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property," the federal agencies never intended that
the transfers with which we are here concerned should be
entirely free of the due-on-sale clause. Such an interpretation would obliterate the uniformity sought.
Nor is it an answer for appellants to point to the language
of the ·FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust form reading:
"This Deed of
Trust shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the Property is located." Apart from the restraint on
alienation and antitrust contentions which we shall hereafter
demonstrate to be unfounded, there is nothing in Virginia law
which would preclude a definition of "sale," "conveyance,"
or "transfer" so as to reach the land trust transactions
entered among the appellants. We find as a matter of construction that the due-on-sale clauses in all of the consolidated cases were triggered.
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17
special knowledge,

a~ainst

and especially when the document derogates

the common law right of free alienation.

18

While it is

true that ambiguities are resolved against the party preparing
the contract, Baird v. Dodson Bros. Exterminating Co., Inc., 217
Va. 745, 749, 232 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1977); VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone
Star Industries, Inc., 215 Va. 366, 371, 209 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1974),
where a document is clear and unambiguous, the doctrine does not
apply.

William Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co. v. Trice, 198 Va. 85, 88-

89, 92 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1956);

~People's

Bank of Rural Retreat

v. People's National Bank of Abingdon, 148 Va. 651, 659-60, 139 S.E.
325, 327

17

(1927) .

19

Here, bearing in mind the nature of a transaction

Cf. the rule that insurance policies will be construed
against the insurer. 17 Arn. Jur. 2d § 276, p.
690 (1972); 4 Williston On Contracts, § 621, pp. 764-72 (3d ed.
1961).

mos~strictly

18

19

As restraints on alienation are not favored, conditions
against alienation are strictly construed, and, even if they
would otherwise be valid, are ineffectual unless certainly and
clearly expressed.
61 Arn. Jur. 2d § 96 at 94 (1972). However,
as we shall later elaborate, there is here no forbidden restraint
on alienation.
See 17 Arn. Jur. 2d S 276, p. 691 (1972):
These principles apply only where a
contract is open to more than one reasonable construction, and should not be applied
to reach an unreasonable construction in
defiance of the terms of the contract, or to
overturn the intention of the parties when it
is clearly manifest from the entire contract.
Furthermore, the rule that expressions will be
interpreted against the party selecting and .
using them applies only where, after the.ordinary rules of construction have been applied, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by which funds are lent to a home purchaser, there is no ambiguity.
Thus, "sold," "conveyed," and "transferred" used in each of the
deeds of trust clearly extended to the land trust transactions,
toppling the house of cards.
The patent error of appellants is their effort to isolate
each instrument and say that it, by itself, is not a conveyance of
beneficial interests, or not a deed to real estate, so no single
document fitting the due-on-sale clause definition exists.

It is,

however, no more than if appellants were to say that 1/3 is not 1,
when one is the requisite number.

While the statement may be true

so far as it goes, the production of three l/3s will serve, and
that is all that has happened here.

Putting the numerous papers

all together they, as part of a single, integrated transaction,
accomplish a "sale," a "conveyance," or a "transfer" within the
meaning of the due-on-sale clause.

After all was said and done,

Mrs. Bailey no longer owned and occupied the Springfield, Virginia
20
property.
Equally, when it was all over, the Williams did.
The
due-on-sale clause therefore operated and required appellants to

20

In construction of a contract, the purpose of the contract
is more important than the academic defi~ition of the words
used.
Krikorian v. Dailey, 171 Va. 16, 197 S.E. 442 (1938) ·
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satisfy in full the accelerated loans secured by the security
21
deeds of trust.

21

In another context, Dean, later Solicitor General, Erwin
J. Griswold, impressive teacher and distinguished lawyer, used
a telling phrase to deal with situations, in the federal tax
area, in which practitioners, by exalting the formality of
words over their true substance, would seek to obtain unwarranted, unreasonable, and unfair advantages. The cases would
inevitably be lost, to the infinite disgust of the ingenious
practitioners.
Dean Griswold called them "You think you're
smart cases."
See,~, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,
469-70 (1935):
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in
respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the
character of the proceeding by what actually
occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation
having no business or corporate purpose--a mere
device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its
real character . . • •
In these circumstances, the facts speak
for themselves and are susceptible of but one
internretation. The whole undertaking, though
conducted according to the terms of subdivision
(B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form
of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which
excludes from consideration the motive of tax
avoidance is not pertinent to the situation,
because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold
otherwise would be to exalt arti'fice above
reality . . . •

-
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II.

Lien or Encumbrance
Elaborateness having failed, appellants turn to sim-

plicity itself.

They point to the FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust

language excluding a lien or encumbrance subordinate to the deed
of trust from the operation of the due-on-sale clause.

The deed

of trust note, it is true, comes ahead of any possessory interests
or rights of enjoyment, whether held by Mrs. Bailey as grantor
or the Williams as grantees, taking precedence in the event of
default.

Every interest is subordinate to the deed of trust.

It

is a first lien.
The simple argument has a simple answer.

While subordin-

ate to the deed of trust, the right to "enjoy the structure as
their home" was not a "lien or encumbrance."
purpose of securing an obligation.

It was not for the

The deed of trust in favor

of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington securing
the note was a lien or encumbrance; the interests of the Williams
were not.

Rather, in every realistic sense, their interest,

regardless of whether, for some purposes, it was real or personal
property, was a fee simple, i.e. beneficial, ownership, subject
to the security interest created by the first deed of trust securing
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the note to First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington.

22

The overly broad meaning which the appellants seek to
attach to "lien and encumbrance" would encompass any interest
created in the property.

It thereby would cause what was clearly

meant as a limited exclusion from the due-on-sale clause applicable
ir. a few cases only to expand so hugely as to swallow-up and extinguish altogether the due-on-sale clause itself.

That argument,

consequently, fails.
In fact, the exception from the triggering of a due-onsale clause when a subordinated lien or encumbrance was imposed on
the property was a requirement of the FHLBB included in its overall

22

A beneficial ownership interest is not an encumbrance.
See, ~· Annotated Code of Virginia§ 8.9-lOS(g): "'Encumbrance'
includes real estate mortgages and other rights in real estate
that are not ownership interests;" (Emphasis added).
Appellants do not appear to contend that the beneficial
ownership interests are a "lien." They are right not to do
so.
While that term is capable of a variety of uses, here
it evidently signifies the customary meaning:
":t claim . .
upon the property . . . as a security for some debt or charge."
2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1978. Again, beneficial ownership interests are not encompassed within the word "lien."
In sum, the rights to beneficial ownership, possession,
and enjoyment fall outside the concept of "lien or encumbrance."
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authorization of the due-on-sale clause.

23

It is absurd to think,

as appellants argue, that the provision was meant to take away completely with one hand what the Bank Board was plainly conferring
24
with the other.
III.

Restraint on Alienation
There remain for consideration restraint on alienation

and Virginia antitrust attacks launched against the deed of trust

23

The authorization reads:

An association continues to have the
power to include, as a matter of contract
between it and the borrower, a provision in
its loan instrument whereby the association
may, at its option, declare immediately due
and payable sums secured by the association's
security instrument if all or any part of
the real property securing the loan is sold
or transferred by the borrower without the
association's prior written consent.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f)

(formerly 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(f)).

However, the regulations in 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) go on to
prohibit exercise of a due-on-sale clause as a consequence
of "creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to
the association's security instrument."
24

Appellants appear to have abandoned a final argument asserted
in their complaint:
"Finally, Plaintiff Beneficiaries are
'assigns' of Mortgagors per 11 15 (sic) of' the deed of trust.
(Presumably the reference was intended to be 11 13)." In all
events the contention is totally unpersuasive. The assignment
provisions of the deed of trust explicitly state that they are
"subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 hereof." Paragraph
17 contains the due-on-sale clause.
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in the FNMA-FHLMC form between the Potes, as borrowers, and
Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association (as successor to Atlantic
Mortgage Company Division of NBD Mortgage Company), as lender.
We turn first to the restraint

25

on alienation contention.

25

Appellants' counsel traces the origins of the legal
concept outlawing unreasonable restraints on alienation to
the 1290 Statute Quia Emptores, the Statute of Westminster,
18 Edw. I. ch. 1. That statute, eliminating the feudal relationship of the feoffee to all mesne lords beneath the king,
and limiting to the king the right to impose restraints on
alienation, is only of historical interest. There has been
little occasion to invoke the statute in the United States,
because of the allodial nature of holdings in this country.
28 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 74-75 (Estates§ 4). Tenure in Virginia is
allodial.
1 Minor, Real Property, § 16 (2d ed. 1928).
In considering the due-on-sale clause it merits remembering
that it is "imposed" not by a predecessor in the homeowner's
chain of title--a mesne landlord, but by a collateral lender
concerned with security for its loan.
Quia Emptores hardly
seems to extend to such matters.
~~
Nevertheless, regardless of the source, there is a general
rule forbidding the fettering of rights of ownership so as to
permit someone else to control its alienation or use.
61 Am.
Jur. 2d p. 108 (Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation,
§ 100).
At the same time, a limited and reasonable restraint
on the power of alienation may be valid.
Id. p. 111, § 102.
For our purposes, we need not finally determine whether there
is no restraint of alienation at all. The result will not
differ, should we conclude that there was no restraint, or should
we determine that, if there be restraint, it is reasonable.
Application of the doctrine outlawing unreasonable restraints
does not appear to turn on whether the relation of the person
creating or enjoying the restraint is in the direct line of
title, or a collateral one.

-
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At the outset we mention, but pass by, the possibility
that the Federal government, through appropriate actions of
congress and the proper administrative agency or agencies, has
fully preempted, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, Clause
2 of the United States Constitution, any state regulation of dueon-sale clauses in the loan instruments of federal associations.
Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox,

~59

F. Supp.

903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), partial summary judgment made final, 481
F. Supp. 616

(C.D. Cal. 1979); see also Meyers v. Beverly Hills

Federal Savings and Loan Association, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.
1974); First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Boston v.
Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979); Conference of Federal
Savings and Loan Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.
1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).

The Court in Glendale

held that federal law, and specifically the FHLBB's authorization,
26
through 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(f),
of due-on-sale clauses, exclusively
governed.

California law, the Court concluded, was "inapplicable

to Glendale Federal's loan instruments executed on and after June
8, 1976."

Id. at 912.

To like effect, Conference of Federal Savings

and Loan Associations v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979),
appeal pending; Bailey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association

Of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979).

26

Recodified in 1980 at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f).
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We pass that simple manner of disposing of the case for
several reasons.

We by no means wish to intimate that such a solu-

tion would be improper, or that, under preemptive federal law, the
due-on-sale clause would not be fully operative.

Rather, as the

case has been presented to us, there would be too many uncertainties,
or assumptions necessitated by absence of proof to justify that
route.

There is another, better marked path which leads to the

same result.
The uncertainties as to preemption by federal law are
several:
1.

The preemption is more evident when the lender

is a federally chartered association.

While the federal con-

nections of Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association are,
from appellants' own pleading, evidently substantial, and while
the FNMA-FHLMC Uniform Instrument has been employed, still the
association is state chartered, and possibly complex questions
arise over preemption insofar as its lending activities are concerned.

The uncertainty is in no way minimized when one realizes

that the original lender, Atlantic Mortgage Company Division of
NBD Mortgage Company, as far as the record

discloses, had no federal

charter or other federal status.
2.

The deed of trust was entered on March 15, 1976,

prior to June 8, 1976, the effective date of the due-on-sale
clause regulations of the FHLBB.
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and associated validation of due-on-sale clauses were extant even
27
prior to June 8, 1976,
although the court in Glendale was careful
tD observe that the

"contention is not before the court on this

motion, and the court expresses no view as to its merit."

Glendale,

supra, 459 F. Supp. at 907.
3.

Whatever the power to preempt may be or may have

been, it seems probable that the FHLBB has not sought, in the
Virginia denominated FNMA-FHLMC uniform instrument form of June
1975 employed in the Pote transaction, to impose on the states
conditions with respect to mortgages or deeds of trust which
would be in violation of state law.

As previously pointed out,

the FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust formulated for Virginia transactions
specifically makes controlling the law of the jurisdiction in which
28
the property is located.

27

See Conference of Federal Savings and Loan Associations v.
SteI""n';" supra, 495 F. Supp. at 17:
California law with respect to the
validity and exercisability of due-onsale clauses in the loan instruments of the
plaintiff Federal associations is inapplicable whether such instruments were executed
before or after the effective date of 12
C . F . R. § 5 4 5 . 6-11 ( f) and ( g) .
See also, Bailey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
Ottawa, U.S.D.C. C.D. Ill., No. 78-1272, October 2, 1979.

28

We are fortunately spared the complications associated with
what to do where a due-on-sale clause is valid under federal
law, but in a particular case leads to a result which_ state law
would disallow as inequitable. See First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 160 (Fla.
App. 1980) ("The true issue before us is not whether a due-on-sale
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paralleled by the FHLBB regulation 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (2) forbidding "a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of
~e

loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause."
Therefore, putting to one side the preemption question, we

proceed to inquire whether an inappropriate restraint on alienation,
under Virginia law, exists.

To do that properly, we must range beyond

the specific question of the due-on-sale clause itself.

Viewed in isola29
tion, it cannot be said to create a restraint on alienation,
or if

29

Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Vence Partnership,
206 Neb. 469,
, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1980) ("An examination of
the law pertaining to restraints on alienation makes it clear that
a 'due on sale' clause is not a restraint on alienation and
cannot be so considered for any purpose, theoretical or practical.")
The due-on-sale clause, standing by itself, can hardly be a restraint on alienation.
In the first place, its effect is to remove
a lien or encumbrance--namely the security deed of trust--and
thereby render the parcel of land more alienable--not less. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the homeowner whose property
is subject to a due-on-sale clause is as free to sell, and, in
selling, to realize as much as a homeowner holding the same property free and clear of any encumbrance. See note 8, supra. Cf.
"Enforcement," supra, at 926:
-To label the loss of a purported favorable
economic position as a restraint on alienation is a misconception of that doctrine,
which was not intended to provide profitability
of alienation, but only the a~ility to alienate
without penalty.
The point is tellingly made by Justice Clark dissenting in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d, 943, 954, 582 P.2d
970, 977 (1978):
Additionally, the majority opinion awards the
owner of the encumbered real property a bonus
in that he can now sell his property for something in excess of what he could sell it for
if unencumbered.
We have thus come full circle.
In attempting to take away contractual rights of
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29

(Cont'd)
lenders in order to assist borrowers in
selling encumbered properties, the majority
opinion has devised a scheme which affords
yesterday's borrower a clear advantage over
today's seller who comes to the marketplace
with his property free from encumbrance.
The majority's attempted rebuttal reads (21 Cal. 3d at
582 P.2d at 975, n.7):

951,

The argument of the dissent--that our
holding places the seller of encumbered real
property at a "competitive advantage" over
the seller of unencumbered real property in
periods of rising interest and tight money-simply misses the point. The fact that
market conditions may operate to hamper the
sale of some real property during such
periods certainly cannot be held to justify
the hampering of all such sales regardless of
whatever financing arrangements may be outstanding against such property. Sellers of
unencumbered real property have presumably
benefited from lower interest rates in
achieving their position. To require sellers
of encumbered real property, who have not
enjoyed this benefit, to suffer from market
contingencies along with those who have, is
to take a very narrow view of "competitive
advantage." In any event we here concern
ourselves with the effect of due-on provisions
in the sale of properties subject to existing
financing--not with the effect of market
conditions upon properties not subject to
existing financing.
The dissent exposes that combination of non-sequitur and
unsupported assumptions for what it is (21 Cal. 3d at 957,
582 P.2d at 979 n.3}:
The majority cling to the thesis that its
decision today serves to eliminate restraints
on alienation. However, in footnote 7 (~,
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29

(Cont'd)
P· 931 [of 2~ Cal. 3d, 582 P.2d at 975]
i~ conc~de~ its.concern only for properties
with existing financing to the disadvantage of
unencumbered properties, when such properties
are competing on the same market.
In an attempt to justify its lack of equal concerns,
it argues that sellers of unencumbered real
property "have presumably benefitted(sic) from
lower interest rates in achieving their position," and now such advantage should be balanced in favor of those who have not benefited(sic),
they being the sellers of encumbered real
property. The presumption by the majority
is completely gratuitous--nothing in the
record nor in sound reason suppor~s it.
See "Enforce!llent," supra, at 926:
This logic problem is cogently noted in Mr.
Justice Clark's ·dissenting opinion in
Wellenkamp (Cal.).
To make the point in another way, consider that the dueon-sale clause does not preclude, forbid, or deter sale of the
property free and clear at any time.
It concerns instead only
the time when the borrower must pay his obligation. It could
hardly be seriously contended that, if a loan secured by a
deed of trust to provide funds to purchase a house were, from
the outset payable on demand, it would amount to an unreason=
able restraint of alienation. So how can it be an unreasonable restraint of alienation for the loan to be payable on
demand under some conditions (in case of sale), and payable
at fixed period intervals under other conditions (in case of
continued ownership and occupancy)? The loan is on terms more
favorable to the borrowers than a totally demand loan would
be, or the terms of a variable interest rate deed of trust,
which a demand deed of trust in important particulars
strongly resembles.
Correspondingly, "[i;]he economic
effect of the variable interest rate mortgage and the exercise
of the due-on clause to achieve an interest rate increase cannot
be vastly different.
"Enforcement," supra, at 930. The Potes
seek to convert an advantage obtained by them when they first
borrowed to buy the house, which there was no legal obligation
for the lender to provide, into an even greater advantage.
What the Potes argue ig that, when they acquired the property,
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29

(Cont'd)
they should have been granted a better deal, allowing full
rights to maintain the full 30 year term status of the loan
despite a change in the home ownership. The economics, if ~he
loan agreement so provided, certainly, as long as conditions
of rising interest rates continue, would then have been more
attractive to the home buyer. On that reasoning, however,
to call the due-on-sale clause a restraint on a subsequent
alienation would logically constitute the use of 10% as the
annual interest rate, instead of 7%, or 6%, or, indeed, any
interest rate, an unreasonable restraint on alienation, as
would, in fact, the requirement that the principal of the loan
ever be repaid.
The subsequent sale will be less attractive
if the loan must be met.
See "Enforcement," supra, at 926:
The reduction of the purchase price brought
about by the increase of interest rate should
do nothing more than reduce the price of the
property to that market rate commanded by
similar properties which are not encumbered.
The seller must use the favorable mortgage
rate as a factor in establishing the price
of the property, in excess of that available
for unencumbered property. Thus, the reduction in price is nothing more than the loss
of a "premium" engendered by the mortgage
rate.
It is simply a misperception to eviscerate, as the California
majority in Wellenkamp appears ready to eviscerate, as a
restraint on alienation, a clause that only precludes the
homeowner from realizing an additional and unbargained for
economic advantage because interest rates have risen since
the time when he secured, by mortgage or deed of trust, his
promise to repay what he borrowed.
Cf. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Association,
73 MTch. App. 163, 165, 250 N.W.2d 804, 805 (1977), another
case where the court decided that its disenchantment with a
due-on-sale clause was so great that it would be invalidated,
although with a reluctant acknowledgment that "the due-onsale clause in question does not fit within the definition of
a restraint on alienation found in the Restatement of the Law
of Property."
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it does, it is one validated by the Virginia legislature.

30

The due-on-sale clause is but one piece in a larger
puzzle:

A loan obtained to finance in part the purchase of one's

home, for which one has given security in the form of a deed of
trust or mortgage, has a variety of facets.

Initially, it is viewed

as an arrangement which will run its full course, here 30 years.
So long as the homeowner continues to own and occupy the house,
he is interested in the protection against call, in the preservation of his right not to pay more than the level monthly payment
fixed at the outset, and contemplated to remain constant during
the whole 360 month period.
But, as time marches on, things may, and frequently do
change.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the problems associated with

changing interest rates, the homeowner may decide to move, preferring
another house, or having been transferred by an employer to another
part of the country.

He wants to sell.

Sometimes ineptly drawn

mortgages or deeds of trust make it a breach of contract to sell
31
without the prior consent of the lender.
The need to obtain

30

Such is the inescapable effect of Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.33
and 330.34, supra, note 7.

31

Even if the only penalty expressed for such a default is
the creation of a right to accelerate and to compel repayment
in full of the deed of trust note, the imposition in the
contemplation of the law is unreasonable. A per~on should not
be placed in a position in which he or she must violate an
agreement, must dishonor his promise, to achieve a result.
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the prior consent of another is a text-book example of an unreason~ble

restraint on alienation.
In such a situation, while the due-on-sale clause may

not be directly involved, still there is something amiss in the
32
total scheme for dealing with any acceleration
of the otherwise
anticipated 30 year obligation.

Whenever the thing that is wrong

represents an attempted unfair advantage to thelender, the courts,
not just in Virginia, but throughout the United States, seek to
achieve justice by denying to the usually economically superior
lender, with presumably the better bargaining position, other
advantages in the package of provisions in the deed of trust
concerning acceleration.
Two lower court Virginia cases illustrate the point:
1.

Best v. United Virginia Bank/National, in the Circuit

Court of Fairfax County, in Chancery, No. 58379, decree dated
February 22, 1979.

There a deed of trust executed September 25,

1972 contained a flat undertaking by the maker of the note that
he would "not assign or transfer the property secured by this
deed of trust without prior approval of the noteholder."

32

The deed

Usually the acceleration is considered a "call" if
initiated by the lender, and "prepayment" if brought about
by the borrower.
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of trust called for automatic acceleration of the full principal upon
breach of that covenant.

The Chancellor ruled that there was a

restraint on alienation, and that it was unreasonable, explicitly
pointing out, however, that if the lender had "wanted to reserve the
right to increase the interest rate .
contracted for such a provision.

.

.

.

the parties could have
An appeal to the Virginia

Supreme Court is currently pending.
2.

Iron Castle Associates v. Wood, in the Circuit Court of

the City of Richmond, Chancery No. G-4808-2, decree dated February
26, 1981.

In 1972, a deed of trust was placed on the property as

security for part of the sales price.
ers:

There was a covenant by grant-

"that they will not transfer the title to the property so long

as this deed of trust remains in full force and effect, without the
consent of the holder or holders of the two notes, which consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld."
Both cases, consequently, involved a flat restraint on
33
alienation.
Furthermore, the deed of trust in each case antedated
the 1974 enactment of Va. Ann. Code §§ 6.1-330.33 and .34.

33

Other prohibition of sale without consent of the lender cases
include: Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 62-63 (Miss. 1975)
("The within property shall not be sold or encumbered without the
express written consent of the within mortgagees, or their assigns."); First Federal Savings and Loan,Association of Englewood
v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. App. 1980) ("No conveyance
of said property, or any part thereof, shall be made by Mortgagor
without the written consent of Mortgagee."). Cf. First Southern
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Brittoil;" 345 So. 2d 300,
301 (Ala. App. 1977) ("The particular clause • • • is as follows:
' . . . The Mortgagor shall not sell or transfer titl7 ••.• without the written approval of the Mortgagee, and any violation
shall constitute a default • . • and, at the option of the
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The lenders are not favored creatures of the law, at
least as compared to borrowers.
the "t"s.

They must dot the "i"s and cross

The due-on-sale clause sometimes evokes strong feelings.

~ the dissent in Crockett v.

First Federal Savincrs and Loan Asso-

ciation of Charlotte, 289 N. Car. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), where
the language used includes:

"a loan shark's trap for the unwary

borrower," 289 N. Car. at 634, 224 S.E.2d at 589, and "sheer extortion,"
289 N. Car. at 642, 224 S.E.2d at 594.
If the interest rates go much higher, the legal profession
may have to cede to lenders precedence in Shakespeare's trenchant
34
line:
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."

33

34

(Cont'd)
Mortgagee, all amounts secured by this mortgage shall become due
and payable.'"); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla.
App. 1970) ("It is hereby agreed that in the event of transfer
of ownership • . . the Mortgagee has the right and privilege of
accepting or rejecting . . . such successor in ownership."); Terry
v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 653, 604 P.wd 504, 505 (1979) ("The
contract . . . was 'not assignable nor [could] the buyer convey
the property without the seller's written consent.'"). But see
Baker v. Loves Park Savings and Loan Association, 61 Ill-:--2°d-rl9,
121, 333 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1975) (Although the mortgage flatly prohibited a sale, assignment or transfer of any right, title or interest without the prior written consent of the mortgagee, the
prohibition was, neve=theless, upheld as a reasonable restraint
on alienation, justifying an increase in the interest rate, a
sanction for default provided in the mortgage in addition to
the right to call the lean.)
Such an attitude no douht underlies a tendency to deny the
advantages of a due-on-sale clause to a lender, on the grounds
that the prospect of an acceleration upon sale was disguised,
or at least not clearly revealed to the borrower. First Southern
Federal Savings & Loan Association of Mobile v. Britton, 345
So. 2d 300, 303-04 (Ala. 1977) ·("We do not say that the mortgagee may not specifically contract for the option to accelerate
in the event of sale unless the purchaser agrees to payment of
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11

Nevertheless, the lenders have legal rights, too.

If

they have complied with all requirements of the law, they are
entitled to enforce their due-on-sale clauses, for they are simply
not restraints on alienation.
In the economics of the moment, the most evident target
is obviously the right of the lender to call when, interest rates
having risen, it is to its advantage to terminate the loan, and

34

(Cont'd)
increased interest up to the current rate at time of assumption
of the unpaid mortgage balance. We do hold that such purpose
may not be hidden behind a clause which is assumed to only
provide protection for the security.
If the clause is to be
used to advance the financial interest of the lender . . . an
increase in the interest rate, such purpose must be openly
stated and bargained for . . . . If the condition . • . may be
hidden • . . , the mortgagor will be at the mercy of the mortgagee.")
That decision of the Court of Civil Appeals of
Alabama was held by the Alabama Supreme Court to be in error.
Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1979). Cf.
''Enforcement," supra, at 927.
In Virginia, however, any judicial concern on that score is
stilled by Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34. Cf. "Enforcement," supra,
at 932:
To the extent that the lack of statement of this underlying purpose of the dueon clause is interposed to bar enforcement
for the purpose of increasing interest rate,
the now widely used FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument attempts to provide 'a clear
statement of this purpose.
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relend the accelerated principal at better rates.

35

It is in such

contexts of something elsewhere rotten in the State of Denmark that
lenders have been denied the right to activate due-on-sale clauses.

35

36

What goes up must, of course, ultimately come down. At some
time, interest rates may fall.
Within the living memory of man,
mortgage interest rates have been as low as 5%, and just possibly
may, in time, return to such a level.
In such circumstances, the
homeowner would want acceleration of the loan in case he should
sell. With rates declining, say, to 5% as against the 8.5%
called for in the Pote deed of trust note of March 15, 1976,
no punishment to the lender would result from invalidation of the
due-on-sale clause, because there existed a requirement of
consent from the lender before any sale couldproperly be made.
Generally (absent an unusual risk to the stabi.lity of the security)
the lender would be happy to have the deed of trust assumed by a
purchase~with no acceleration, in view of the favorable interest
rate. Thus, where interest rates have fallen, it would be the
prohibition on sale without consent itself which the ho~eowner
would be interested in seeing invalidated.
If acceleration upon sale were not permitted to the homeowner
in an atmosphere of declining interest rates (or if he could
accelerate only upon the payment of a substantial premium or
penalty), the homeowner would be placed in a situation where he
could not sell on as favorable terms as would be the case if he
were an owner of his premises free and clear of the lien or
encumbrance of a deed of trust. As already observed, that
disadvantage manifestly is a restraint on alienation. See Iron
Castle Associates v. Wood, supra; ~· supra.

36

Related to the results where there is something amiss, are
similar results achieved by narrowly limited interpretation
where the deed of trust contains language indicating an understanding of the parties that the due-on-sale clause was intended
only as a protection of the lender's secarity interest. Sometimes the security instrument may remark that a purpose of the
due-on-sale clause is to protect the lender's security. Applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius, courts have foreclosed resort to the'"dUe-on-sale clause absent a showing by
the lender that the security would be impaired (not usually an
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36

(Cont'd)
easy burden since the selling homeowner remains obliged to
pay the note, with the purchaser of the home, who assumes the
debt, an additional obliger).
See Best, supra, where a clause
providing for acceleration in case of an unapproved sale was
described as include~ in the deed of trust "in order more fully
to protect the security of the Deed of Trust." Cf. First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Englewood v. LockWood, supra,
385 So. 2d at 159:
'"It is the intent of this mortgage~
secure payment of said note . . . ' Thus, the sole purpose set
out by First Federal deals with the protection of its security."
Other courts have taken the further questionable step of
asserting that any purpose underlying the insistence by a lender
on a due-on-sale clause save protection of the security (and in
particular a purpose 'to protect against the adverse consequences
of rising interest rates) is not permitted by law. Wellenkamp
v. Bank of America, supra, 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77:
"For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a due-on-sale clause
contained in a promissory note or deed of trust cannot be enforced
upon the occurrence of an outright sale unless the lender can
demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect
against impairment to its security or the risk of default."
See also Patton v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of
PhOenIX;° 118 Ariz. 473, 478-79, 578 P.2d 152, 157-58 (1978)
(" . . . we . . . hold that the 'due on sale' clause cannot be
enforced unless First Federal can show that its security is
jeopardized by the transfer of the subject property . . . • ");
Bellingham First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Garrison,
supra, 87 Wash. 2d at 441, 553 P.2d at 1092; Annotation, Validity,
construction, and Application of Clause Entitling Mortgagee to
Acceleration of Balance Due in Case of Conveyance or Transfer of
Mortgaged Property, 69 A.L.R.3d 713, 749-50 (1976).
No Virginia case has so held, and such a decision would be
difficult to sustain in light of Article I, Section 1 of the
Virginia Constitution (the Bill of Rights); cf. Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E. 327 (1903).
Nor has any Virginia case reasoned that, unless the document
expressly spells out a particular reason ~or the inclusion of
the due-on-sale clause (i.e., here, the right to minimize the
adverse consequences of rises in interest rates), it is to be
deemed that no such purpose for the clause was intended by the
parties.
(For example, contrast an intermediate appellate court
in New York which has held that the failure to state in the
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That, should not, however, be confused with the situation
where nothing else in the package is amiss. Then the due-on-sale
37
clause may be relied on by the lender.
There is nothing inherently

36

(Cont'd)
mortgage, as the purpose of the due-on-sale clause, the wish
to raise the interest rate, to protect against market fluctuation,
precludes exercise of a due-on-sale clause when that indeed is
the only purpose.
Silver v. Rochester Savings Bank, 73 App. Div. 2c
81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980) (mortgage provided mortgagee would
not unreasonably withhold consent to a sale,))
Under the FNMA/
FHLMC uniform deed of trust, that "interpretation" would be too
forced.
The Potes' deed of trust permits the due-on-sale clause
to operate "[i)f all or any part of the Property or an interest
therein is sold or transferred . . . "except for four specific
cases, none of which is applicable here:
(i) subordinate lien
or encumbrance, (ii) security for household appliances, (iii) succession by one life tenant on the death of another, and (iv)
leasehold interest of less than three years. The interest rate
fluctuation is evidently a, indeed the, principal underlying
characteristic of home lending activrt"ies which leads lenders
to insist on due-on-sale clauses.
"Enforcement," supra, at
896-97 (" . . . whatever the traditional purpose of a due-on
clause, its modern purpose has been to relieve the lender of
low-interest rate loans in its portfolio.").
It cannot reasonably be held not to have been contemplated as a reason for the
clause.

37

Such is the precise holding of the only Virginia authority
which appears to be squarely on point. Lipps v. First American
Savings & Loan Association, in the Circuit Court of Prince William
County, Chancery No. 13246, decree dated March 19, 1980, appeal
pending to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court h~d ~e~ore
it a transaction which used the June 1975 FNMA-FHLMC Virginia
Uniform Instrument.
It held that a sale brought into operation
the due-on-sale clause, conferring on the savings and loan
association the right to accelerate.
It further held that the
due-on-sale clause was legal and enforceable and in accordance
with the statutes of Virginia.
It is only the case's lack of finality because of the pe~d
ing appeal which prevents us from giving preclusive effect in
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unfair or unreasonable in such a rule.

The reason making it important

that the loan should run its full 30 year course dissipates when
the homeowner sells.

Then, in the huge majority of the cases at

least (lenders, at the outset, having advanced on the security of
the house only a portion of the purchase price, a reduction in the
principal having occurred through monthly payments from time of
original purchase to time of sale, and a usual consequence of inflation being an increase in the value of the residence--Mrs. Bailey
sold to the Williams for $79,903.63 premises for which she and her
husband three years before had paid $63,831), the proceeds are
available and adequate to meet the acceleration.
Inspecting the details of the Pote deed of trust reveals
no flaws in facets related to acceleration in the due-on-sale
clause or in clauses other than the due-on-sale clause.
It does not require the lender's consent to a sale.

It

only permits the lender, at its option, to exercise the due-on-sale
clause if there has been a sale, which the Potes, as homeowners, are
fully entitled to make without any dishonoring of their word.

37

In

(Cont'd)
this matter of state law. However, for the reasons we have advanced, the case appears to have been rightly decided. Cf.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Six Companies
of California v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180,
188 (1940); C.I.R. v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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case the due-on-sale clause is activated, the resulting acceleration
38
may not give rise to any charge, premium or penalty.
There is
none provided for in the Pote deed of trust in case of a call by
39
the lender.

38

The FHLBB regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (2), explicitly
forbids "a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration
of the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause."
Va. Ann. Code§ 1.6-330.33 declares that "[n]o lender shall
collect or receive any prepayment penalty on loans secured by
real property . . . if said prepayment results from the enforcement of the right to call the loan upon the sale of the real
property which secures said loan."

39

See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savinqs & Loan Association,
73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977). That case invalidated
a due-on-sale clause, but in taking that action was careful to
distinguish a North Carolina case, Crockett v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d
580 (1976), on the very grounds that "a mortgagor's ability to
prepay without penalty and take advantage of declining interest
rates supported a like ability on the part of the mortgagee to
take advantage of interest rates in his favor." The note in
Nichols imposed a penalty for prepayment.
In upholding a due-on-sale clause in Crockett, the North
Carolina court read the financing documents as creating a right
in the lender to accelerate at its option, in the event of a sale,
but further creating a right in the borrower "to prepay whenever
he chose and take advantaae of lower interest rates in the market."
Crockett, supra, 289 N.C. -at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
To the same effect is Century Federal Savings and Loan Association of Bridgeton v. Van Glahn, 144 N;J. Super. 48, 54, 364
A. 2d 558, 562 (1976) ("This mortgage may be prepaid. Thus if,
in this case, the interest rate had fallen, the borrower would
have been privileged to refinance his debt elsewhere at the.lower
rate and pay off the loan.
The borrower may repay the entire
debt without penalty three years after the date of the mortgage,
although slight penalties prior to that date are assessed.").
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As for a prepayment, not accompanying a sale, there is
nothing about which the Potes were entitled to complain.

A right

to prepay in whole or in part at any time was specifically conferred
in the note secured by the deed of trust.

After the first 5 years

of the life of the deed of trust, all or any part of the outstanding
principal of theloan could be prepaid without any charge, premium, or
penalty, regardless of the source of the funds used for prepayment.
During the first 5 years, a charge, not to exceed 1% of the amount
by which aggregate prepayments in any year were in excess of 20%
of the original principal amount was collectible, if, but only if,
the source of the prepayment funds was a lender to the Potes other
than the note-holder (originally Atlantic Mortgage Company Division
of NBD Mortgage Company, and, by succession, Washington-Lee Savings
.
.
40
and Loan Association).
Those penalties fell comfortably within the requirements
41
of Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.27
in force when the deed of trust

40

The maximum penalty for prepayment of the $44,000 Pote loan
was, consequently, $352.00 (1% of $35,200, i.e. $44,000 less
20% or $8800). No evidence was adduced by appellants to suggest
that the penalty was excessive, given the need for the lender
to incur the expense of investigations and decisions preparatory to relending the prepayment. We cannot say simply
from the figure of $352 itself, that it is excessive or otherwise unjust.

41

A 1979 amendment, renumbered § 6.1-330.27.1 made no changes
of significance for the purposes with which we are concerned.
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consequences of a breach of the statute forecloses the imposition
of another, unspecified sanction.

Fourth National Bank of N.Y. v.

Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747, 756 (1887):
'The liability and the remedy were created
by the same statute. This being so, the
remedy provided is exclusive of all others.
A.general liability created by statute,
without a remedy, may be enforced by common
law action.
But where the provision for
the liability is coupled with a provision
for a special remedy, that remedy, and that
alone, must be employed.'
Thus, the due-on-sale clause became available to the lender upon
44
the Potes' sale to the Saltos.

44

For cases from jurisdictions other than Virginia, not
otherwise referred tc in this opinion, upholding the validity
of due-on-sale clauses see Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529
(Tenn. 1973); Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Mutual Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d
531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976); First Commercial Title Inc. v. Holmes,
92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Tidewell v. Wittmeier, 150
Ala. 253, 254-55, 43 So. 782, 783 (1907); Stockman v. Burke,
305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1975); People's Savings Association v.
Standard Industries, Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406
(1970); Shalit v. Investors Savings and Loan Association, 101
N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968); Stith v. Hudson City Savings
Institution, 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Mutual Real
Estate Investment Trust v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675,
395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977). Cf. Miller v. Pacific First Federal
Savings and Loan Association, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
Contra: Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78,
,
486 P.2d 190, 193 (1971) ("Absent an allegation that the purpose
of the clause is in some respect being circumvented or that the
mortgagee's security is jeopardized a plaintiff cannot be entitled
to equitable relief,"); Continental Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977) ("No allegation was made . . • to show the mortgagee's security as impaired . • . . we, therefore, find that it was unreasonable
and inequitable for appellant to impose a one per cent transfer
fee as a condition precedent to giving its consent to transf7r
the mortgage because neither the note nor the mortgage contained
such a provision; . . • ").
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- so -

IV.

Antitrust Law Contention
Finally, we must briefly attend to the attenuated argument

that a due-on-sale clause, without more, ipso facto violates the
45
Virginia antitrust law.
In the first place, there is no evidence
of any kind to suggest that adoption of the due-on-sale clause
by the lenders to the Potes proceeded from a conspiracy or other

combination.

Each home lender, acting on its own, was quite capable

of perceiving the benefits to it flowing from the due-on-sale clause
and of instituting, without the cooperation or assistance of others,
a uniform practice of requiring acceleration of the loan upon a
sale of the premises.
In essence, a due-on-sale clause only concerns a contractual
undertaking as to when one must pay one's duly incurred debt.

Its

restraining effect on trade would be no more than that imposed on
a homeowner and his real estate, for example, if someone were to
reduce an obligation of his to judgment, and thereupon immediately
should seek to realize by forcing sale of the premises.

So customary

a "restraint" would hardly fall within the ambit of the antitrust law
without quite expli=it language, none of which appears in the
Virginia statute.

45

C0llection of a debt in and of itself does not

Va. Ann. Code§ 59.1-9.5 makes unlawful "[e]very contract,
combination or consp.i racy in restraint of trade or commerce· ·
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constitute an antitrust violation.

D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn

Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).

The Virginia antitrust

law is to be "applied and construed . . . in harmony with judicial
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions."

Va.

Ann. Code § 59.1-9.17.
Furthermore, the Virginia antitrust act excludes from
its operation
46
or federal.

conduct vetted by an administrative agency, state
We have already observed that, while Washington-Lee

Savings and Loan Association is state-chartered it, in the circumstances of this case, is intimately related to activities of FNMA,
FHLMC and the FHLBB, the deed of trust having been developed and
approved by those federal agencies.

Washington-Lee Savings and Loan

Association is a seller servicer for the FHLMC, a federally related

46

Va. Code Ann. § 59.l-9.4(b) provides:
Nothinq contained in this chapter shall
make unlawful conduct that is authorized,
regulated or approved (1) by a statute of
this State, or (2) by an administrative or
constitutionally established agency of this
State or of the United States having jurisdiction of the subject matter and having
authority to consider the anticompetitive
effect, if any, of such conduct~ Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed to
alter or terminate any other applicable
limitation, exemption or exclusion.
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lender.

The FHLMC regularly purchases interests in mortgages and
47
deeds of trust.
Manifestly the several federal agencies have
the authority to consider the

anticompetitive effect of due-on-sale

clauses.
Of course, it could be argued that Washington-Lee Savings
and Loan Association is state-chartered, and no Virginia agency
comparable to the FHLMC has addressed at all the question of the
anticompetit~ve

effect, if any, of due-on-sale clauses.

We pass

the question of why the Virginia antitrust law, if the legislature
wanted to differentiate on the basis of status as federal agency

47

The purpose of the due-on-sale clause evidently was to deter
a practice which would diminish profits or cause losses to
federal savings and loan institutions. If the result for which
the appellants contend could be achieved, the development would,
in the course of time, inexorably lead to an increase in interest rates over and beyond and independent of increases attributable to other factors.
Essentially all future purchasers of
homes in the end would suffer, just to permit a relative few
who, despite sale, could hang on to the economic benefits of
a mortgage or deed of trust with a favorable interest rate to
benefit.
Prevention of that is a public purpose which evidently
outweighs the allowance of the windfall sought by the appellants
in the transactions here under scrutiny. As Justice Davis dissenting in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, supra, 21 Cal. 3d at 954,
582 P.2d at 977 so cogently put it:
But our beneficence may be shortsighted. For
in attempting to assist the Wellenkamps, the
majority opinion must necessarily restrict if
not dry up mortgage funds otherwise available
to the next generation of borrowers.
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contrasted to status as state agency, was drafted purely in terms
of conduct.

Nevertheless,

in interpreting the Virginia antitrust

statute, it is not reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended
to allow federally chartered institutions to operate with a distinct
competitive advantage over essentially identical Virginia institu48
tions.
It is a bizarre reading of an antitrust statute which
leads to imposition of a palpable competitive disadvantage.
Moreover, there is also an exclusion from the reach of
the Virginia antitrust law for conduct that is authorized, regulated,
or approved by a Virginia statute.

Va. Ann. Code§ 59.l-9.4(b) (1).

While appellants strenuously contend that Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34
calling for prominent display of a notice that there is a due-onsale clause whenever one appears in a mortgage or deed of trust is
not an approval, we conclude that the manifestly broader coverage
of "authorized, regulated or approved" suffices to insulate due-onsale clauses from the Virginia antitrust law, at any rate when

48

One can only wonder where it leaves the jurisprudence of
California with its state court decision, Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), decided
August 25, 1978, essentially voiding due-on-sale clauses for
state lending institutions speedily followed, pn November 1,
1978, by Glendale Federal Savings and Loai:i Association v. Fox,
459 F. Supp. 903 (c.o. Cal. 1978), which held valid due-on-sale
clauses in lending docUI11ents of federal associations. The state
can hardly relish the competitive disadvantage inexorably
following for state lending associations.
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considered solely in and of themselves and not in connection
with other activities.
Thus, the due-on-sale clause was fully enforceable
against the Potes.

Judgment in all of the Consolidated
Cases AFFIRMED.
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